This is my article about the FA-50 Eagle, and the AS-211 Warrior of the Philippine Air Force, along with some minor editorials, and corrections.
FA-50, credit to http://www.koreaaero.com
So let us first understand the purpose and roles of the AS-211, and the FA-50 in the Philippine Air Force,
"SIAI-Marchetti S-211 jet trainers were first delivered to the Philippine Air Force during the late 1980s and early 1990s. These aircraft served in a training role with a secondary attack function during the 1990s and into the 2000s. These aircraft were locally referred to as AS-211s and nicknamed "Warriors." In 1997 SIAI-Marchetti was acquired by Aermacchi, who continued to work the Philippine Air Force in relation to its AS-211 fleet (globalsecurity.org)."
"The squadron of 12 FA-50s from SouthKorea was acquired by the previous Aquino administration for P18 billion, one of two big-ticket items in the country's modest military modernization program." "The FA-50 is technically a fighter trainer but the PAF acquired it to perform multiple roles. The aircraft were acquired by the previous administration to boost the country's defenses in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea) given China's aggressiveness in claiming maritime territories there." "The acquisition of the FA-50s marked the PAF's return to the supersonic age a decade after retiring the last of its US-made F5 fighter jets in 2005 (rappler.com)."
HISTORY
Let us look upon the history of both aircraft in the Philippine Air Force, and to clear confusions to the roles of the Aermacchi AS-211 Warrior which according to the manufacturer is a Basic Jet Trainer/Light Strike Aircraft while the KAI FA-50 Eagle according to Korean Aerospace Industry (KAI) is originally a Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) based on the Advance Jet Trainer platform the T-50 Eagle, the FA-50 was acquired for, and is intended to perform Lead In Fighter Trainer (LIFT) as well as Multi-Role Fighter (MRF) functions.
"Subsequently, in March 2014 the PAF signed contracts that included the purchase of the 12 FA-50PHs. In addition, a requirement to install advanced radar systems and accompanying medium-range air-to-air missiles on three or four aircraft was revealed. This will bestow beyond-visual-range capability and enable the PAF to undertake 'long-range interceptions (janes.com)."
Why did the Philippine Air Force converted their Aermacchi S-211 into a jet fighter trainer known as the AS-211 code named "Warrior", the answer is simple;
"With the final retirement of the F-5 fleet in October 2005, the AS-211s filled their role in the external Philippine air defense mission. Air Force officials stated that the arrangement was merely a stop gap measure (globalsecurity.org)."
The AS-211 Warriors were used in Interception, as well as in the Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations of the Philippine Government, the Philippine Air Force are forced to do so because of the lack of air assets of the Philippine Air Force during those times.
Operators of the T-50 Trainer variants, credit to http://www.koreaaero.com
MANILA, May 17 -- The Philippines has a very good jungle warfare school in Ternate, Cavite, a ranking American military official involved in the anti-terrorism phase of this year's "Balikatan" exercises, has said.
In an interview Tuesday, US Joint Task Force commander Brig. Gen. John Jansen said he has observed American and Filipino troops perform counter-terrorism drills in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija and Ternate, Cavite a few days ago.
"They train to a very high level that brings in the kind of capabilities that you need to be able to locate, identify, track, close with and do the things that need to be done relative to terrorists," Jansen said.
Drills include clearing a town infested with terrorists and disarming improvised bombs and explosives left by lawless elements.
"You’ve got a very good jungle warfare training school down there. In fact, we think we have a very good jungle warfare training school in Okinawa, Japan. It’s very tough, they put you out there with a bottle of water and a Kaybar knife. They put you out there and pick you up in seven days kind of thing. Our Marines say that yours is tougher here, down there in Ternate," he added.
This year's "Balikatan" exercises began last May 8 and winds up on May 19. (PFN/PNA)
Taken on April 14, 2016 shows US marines walking next to their transport and amphibious vehicles at a temporary camp, Philippine Star
Both the Philippines and the United States have decided to use this year's Balikatanexercises for humanitarian missions, instead of training soldiers in traditional "war games," Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) spokesman RestitutoPadilla said on Thursday.
Padilla — during an Air Force symposium in Shangri La at the Fort — told reporters that this was part of the two countries' decision to scale back military drills or "live fire exercises" in response to President Rodrigo Duterte's disdain for their longstanding defense alliance.
"Ngayon ay magre-reduce dahil ifo-focus natin yung mga kakayahan ng mga puwersa natin na siyang nangunguna pag nagkaroon ng mga bagyo," he said, without revealing by how much the number of troops to be sent to the Balikatan will be slashed.
Padilla explained that the annual bilateral exercises with the US have taken on a new focus, which is humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations.
"Balikatan has undertaken a new phase which is more concentrated on expected events," Padilla said.
"These are threats that come from weather disturbances, hazards, so this is the reason why a refocusing of Balikatan has been shifted to humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and counter terrorism. These are the issues of the day that need action," he added.
He denied that the scaling down of the Balikatan exercises was meant to downplay the Philippines' ties with US.
"Hindi naman nangangahulugan na isinangtabi na natin ang ating alyansa," he said.
Like the Philippines, the US has also reduced the troops participating in the military exercises after the shift in focus.
"Similarly as we have reduced, they [the US troops] have also reduced because they will only put in the necessary personnel who will be involved in the areas that we have focused in this year," Padilla said.
Shortly after assuming the presidency, President Rodrigo Duterte said he wanted to end the Philippines' joint military exercises with the US.... (END OF REPORT)
"Shortly after assuming the presidency,
PresidentRodrigoDuterte said he wanted to
end the Philippines' joint military exercises with the US"
The reasons why the 2017 WAR GAMES known as the Balikatan exercises (Shoulder to Shoulder exercises) were almost completely postponed, was because of the dis-approval of the Chief-Executive President Duterte about such war games, in fear that it might "provoke China", and according to this administration the end goal of the war games might start "trouble" or a "war", that is not true, the purpose of the Balikatan exercises (Shoulder to Shoulder exercises) is to prepare the Philippines from any threat may it be against terrorists, local-insurgents, or foreign threats.
US Armed Forces, DWIZ Mas Todong Lakas
While the US Armed Forces also train and educate members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) on how to operate and use advance and modern weapons and equipment that is not yet available in the inventory of the armed forces, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on the other hand train US Armed Forces on how to survive in the jungle, informational and educational training and exercises about jungle warfare, guerrilla warfare, etc, both share information that might benefit the interests of the parties involved.
Japan, and Australia are both observers to the annual Balikatan exercises (Shoulder to Shoulder exercises), Japan announced that it is interested to join in the war games, along with the armed forces of USA, Philippines, and Japan it might have been an amazing show of force, but unfortunately the present administration is "fun at parties"
During the Balikatan exercises (Shoulder to Shoulder exercises) the Armed Forces of the Philippines could also show case their new assets, where they could use and test them in actual combat simulation, along with our allies.
Last Balikatan exercises (Shoulder to Shoulder exercises) the US Armed Forces trained pilots of the Philippine Air Force on interception, beach head assault and landing, and how to invade a island that is already occupied by enemy forces the US Armed Forces even brought in M777 howitzers, MLRS, P-8, P-3C, jet fighters, attack helicopters (like the Cobra) warships, etc, is that a bad thing? The persons and organizations that would oppose such activities (as always) are members of the left, socialist-communist groups (like the CPP-NPA-NDF and Bayan Muna), and the like.
Not only that on every Balikatan exercises (Shoulder to Shoulder exercises), US and Philippine forces also conduct community service by building schools, roads, health programs, etc to the local communities where the annual Balikatan exercises (Shoulder to Shoulder exercises) is held.
The stand, and decision of the present administration against the Balikatan exercises (Shoulder to Shoulder exercises) is very disappointing. .
With regards to the things pertaining to the Reservist and Mandatory Reservist Officer Training Corps (ROTC), a quoted commentary is indeed a good writeup to get ponder upon.
We
are starting to create living nightmares out of our own prejudices and false
beliefs that we cannot stand against a sleeping giant. While we are having
these shadow games with China, we cannot solve our domestic problems. We are
like a house being constantly ransacked at the same time ignorant and
nonchalant that everything is just alright – simply because we do not want to
step out of the house. We know that the burglar has infiltrated the foundations
of the house – only to find that the burglar is not there where you thought he
is there – and for every foundation being crippled by the constant ransacking
and stealing, the very house that we came to live with everybody else starts to
crumble down – until we wait for the time burglar steals the home’s precious
jewels, decides to ignite the house on fire.
What
we don’t realize is that we end up in a hellish sea of fire – just because of
being so ignorant of what’s happening around. Just because we have not stood up
to dissent China the same way we are like cowards when inciting argumentative
blows on what we believe in. How Ironic. How can we actually speak about how so
messianic a leader is if we can’t join hands in taking stance that another
country can’t just capture the islands of another, aided by the ruling of an
International Arbitration Court? Is this the death of common sense itself, or
the death of a national identity?
Mr.
Armando Herendia, a member of the DefensePH forums puts into light how it seems
that we have emerged as the cowards of ASEAN while being backstabbed by China:
“So let's continue the
lesson. Why are people afraid of having the Philippines push back on the
Chinese at Panatag? I've heard: WW3, nukes, and yes someone started talking to
me about chemtrails. Ugh.
So let's be clear: Indonesia
has seized and publicly televised blowing up Chinese vessels caught fishing in
their waters. Did they get nuked? Did WW3 start that week? Did Indonesia become
a Chinese state after being invaded by PRC Marines? No.”
Even
Argentina – a South American Country which is thousands of miles away from the
Philippine coastline at that – can publicly show their Navy blasting Chinese
ships lurking on their waters. China has the whole Pacific Ocean to own for
crying out loud. But why not the Philippines? We are a country having the
oceans and seas as our Iron Curtain, with a strategic defense position in the
Asia Pacific Region. Unlike Russia’s takeover of Crimea, we are not in a
landlock dispute that redraws our current territorial domain. We are fortunate
enough that this dispute with China has not turned into a literally
geographical takeover.
Mr.
Heredia ignites a flicker of hope through the example of the BRP Sierra Madre:
“Why haven't we been able to
push back at Panatag? The answer is quite simple, and is the same answer as to
why we grounded an LST called Sierra Madre to keep a shoal. For DECADES, the
Philippines has lacked ships that have the RANGE, SPEED and ENDURANCE to stay
out in the Spratleys as well as Panatag, Benham and other contested areas in
order to maintain a Presence.”
What is a Presence? Parang
bantay tao sa bahay mo habang nasa bakasyon ka. It is a physical presence to
ensure you know what is going on at a location, and more importantly, a local
way to exert power.”
The
Chinese are playing with our ideology – or if any exists within us Filipinos.
Because they know that we, the Filipino people serving as the electorate who
put our officials in power, don’t have a sense of national social
consciousness, that we’d rather complain endlessly on a problem than work in
unison amidst dissent in political belief to solve the problem.
But
amidst all the aggression and underestimation of China on the Philippines’
military might, our firm resolve to assert our sovereignty is growing ever
stronger, with the military buildup that we’re strengthening, backed by an International
Arbitration Rule:
“The Chinese have perfected
the Presence game. We, all of us in Asia, are playing catch up. That's the
thing about the Chinese, they think in terms of 30 years - that's there short
term plan. Over 30 years ago, they saw reaching the situation and the power
they have today and they worked their ass off for it. Can we say the same? In
order to keep Panatag, Benham, and the few other locations that the Chinese
have bit yet reclaimed and seized, we need to establish a Presence at those
locations.
In 2012, there was exactly
ONE ship that could reach any location contested by the Chinese, at a speed
that made the response timely, and it didn't matter what the sea conditions
were like. That ship was the Gregorio del Pilar. The former US Coast Guard
cutter was designed to cruise 10,000 nautical miles, at a very decent speed,
and was originally able to handle sea conditions that would sink any other PN
vessels - the rest of whom are the WW2 era ships we are still trying to replace
today. Today there are three del Pilars, and now the PCG will soon have four
out of ten Parola class patrol vessels bought from Japan.
The Chinese have kept a Presence everywhere.
You've seen them guarding the shoal at Panatag. You've seen them interfering
with the resupply vessel at Sierra Madre. You've seen them water cannoning and
tasering our poor fishermen. A conventional shooting war will not start if we
put up our own Presence.
The Chinese cannot escalate
and still make it look like they are the aggrieved party, for as long as the
Philippines uses unarmed PCG BFAR and other non-military ships. This is the
only way we can secure Panatag. We need to stop being afraid to protect and
assert our rights over what is ours. The more ships we have that meet those
three requirements, the better off we will be.”
In the Art of War, the Author Sun Tzu once said – “If you
know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred
battles.” If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gaines you
will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will
succumb in every battle.”
And in the battle for the West Philippine Sea, it seems that
we need to be pushed to the brink of war to realize that we have lost this
maritime war even before it started – for we don’t know the enemy, and we even
don’t know ourselves.
But only if we let it continue that way. Only if we let our presently
politicized beliefs on this seemingly endless battle of moves and countermoves
shadow a century-old battle cry that is dying a natural death while in an ongoing
seemingly fairy tale of Independence:
Our nationalism as a Filipino people.
It seems that no new frigates, new FA-50s or even additional
troops will ever put a plot twist on this ‘beating-around-the-bush’ game with
China.
Mr. Armando Herendia, a member of the DefensePH forums puts
it in perspective:
“Everyone’s up in arms about Panatag, and fearful of how we
cannot confront the Chinese, and blaming the Americans for not stepping in.
Yet, where are the silly supporters who say the Americans
can’t interfere with Philippine affairs? Where are those people now?
Duterte is blaming the Americans for not stepping in – yet wasn’t
he the one also saying “Putang Ina,” insulting a sitting president, and telling
them to get out of the country, and downgrading EDCA?”
Yet no
one remembers, PNoy in 2012, using the newly commissioned Gregorio Del Pilar
(PF-15) - an Excess Defense Article from America - confronts the Chinese at
Panatag. And he does this without any clearance or permission from the
Americans. He does so in such a manner that the US has to step in to broker a
negotiation, and both sides back off. The Chinese later BREAK their word and
return to occupy Panatag.”
And
there will be those who are struck with intense political bias that this
President did nothing unlike the present administration. But come to think of
it – is this a question of a political bias, or a question of a wretched
consciousness that this country’s wounds are caused not by its politicians, but
by people who refuse to believe in the concept of ‘being my brother’s keeper’ -
that only by uniting together as one race, regardless of social class, age, belief and
political beliefs are we to move forward as a nation?
Mr.
Herendia furthermore, elaborates a more intricate string of ironies:
“Yet this Philippine Administration is asking why the Americans didn't
block the Chinese? Where is the "Independent Foreign Policy free from the
Americans?"
Hey Duterte here's a clue - you tell people you don't need
help and in a very rude and undiplomatic manner, don't sit there wondering why
no one is helping you.
The reality is this - Panatag is 150 nautical miles from
Luzon, less than a day's boat ride. In any other nation-state, this is
considered a territorial integrity issue.
That is a Philippine EEZ, and those
are Philippine resources being blockaded and yes, stolen, by Chinese national
fishing fleets. And it is a Philippine shoal that is about to be occupied by a
Chinese national structure.
The answer is very simple - put a Presence Out
There. Stop them from building. Don't sit there and blame the Americans for not
having raised a finger - you were the ones that kicked them out, called their
sitting President a Son of a B---- and downgraded previously agreed upon
arrangements.
You want to complain about previous administrations doing
nothing? The last Administration actively confronted the Chinese on the high
seas and also won you an International Court Decision.
What happens after PNoy?
The people who broke their word and took back the Shoal are now holding a 3
BILLION DOLLAR CREDIT LINE and 9 BILLION SOFT LOAD MARKER over the the
Philippines.
Sino kaya ngayon dapat umaangal nang kapal nang mukha?”
“If you know neither
the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”
Sun Tzu was right – if we have forgotten who the real enemy
is, then certainly in the near uncertain future Panatag Shoal – which is just
stone’s throw away from Palawan and Palawan itself, will be helplessly overrun
in our own backyard. If we do not change our consciousness that our faith must
not solely lie on politicians who can deliver multi-billion dollar military
reform packages and fearless, unrelenting, and firm orations, then we can play
hide and seek tactics forever – but the endgame is that we are all losers as a
Filipino race even before we can send ships to our claims for sovereignty.
We just simply can’t accept and come to realize that we are the
problem – for if we come to realize this, we will all refuse to accept that it
is the problem and we all haplessly watch China tiptoe on our waters - for not everybody cares. Not everyone listens. Not everyone wants to discuss. Not everyone wants to agree to disagree. Not everyone wants to dissent.
Not everyone wants to face the ugly truth.
Now, let me ask again – who really is the problem?
"The first step in resolving a problem is acknowledging that there is one."
This written article may go inspire out of the Philippine Armed Forces wherein speaking of second hand equipment, many lessons will be gathered from the experience of the Singaporean Armed Forces long before it became the most advanced military in the South East Asia. These in which, is a thing that needs to get pondered upon. From the points of the Defense Minister of Singapore Ng Eng-Hen in the book "Engineering our Navy".
BRP Gregorio del Pilar FF-15, an ex-Hamilton cutter of the US Coast Guard.
Acquisition of pre-owned military platforms can be a cost-effective solution to meet operational requirements but it also poses significant challenges. While these issues can be partially mitigated through a well-crafted contract and close supervision during the acquisition, the challenge comes in handling the unexpected and resolving them swiftly in order not to impact the program schedule adversely. Our engineers provide some insight into the challenges faced and suggest measures that can be used to refine the existing framework for the acquisition of pre-owned platforms. Pre-owned military platforms are opportunity buys that can be brought into service rapidly and cost effectively. Compared to the long lead time required to design, build and test new military platforms, pre-owned platforms typically only require country specific modifications and refurbishment and therefore can be inducted into service in a short time. Such acquisitions are not new to the SAF. Pre-owned platforms such as the Country-class LST's, AMX-13 light tanks and A-4 Skyhawks allowed the SAF to build up military capabilities which were required urgently in it's formative years, in a quick and cost-effective manner. While the SAF has evolved over the years and many new systems have been acquired, the advantage offered by opportune pre-owned military platforms has not been completely dismissed. This is clearly demonstrated by the acquisition of the Challenger-class submarines as well as the Leopard 2 tanks. Our engineers know there is a wealth of experience in the realm of acquiring pre-owned platforms, and many project teams have since drawn on this knowledge. Framework for Acquiring Defense Systems Over the years, the MINDEF has developed a structured approach to manage the life cycle of defense systems. The framework serves to guide the management of systems throught the system's life cycle, beyond just the acquisition phase. It has been useful in the management of new systems and capabilities. While the process for the acquisition of new build military platforms is well defined and the challenges understood, the same cannot be said of the acquisitions projects of pre-owned platforms. Being opportunistic buys, such acquisition projects of pre-owned platforms tend to be ad-hoc purchases, and have unique project management and technical challenges. As such, the existing framework can be adapted to better reflect the unique challenges of such acquisitions. Unique Challenges in Acquisition of Pre-owned Platforms Time pressure to conclude opportunistic acquisitions is usually leaves the project team with little time to examine the state of the component systems on board the platforms thoroughly and properly, look out for defects or to validate the prevailing performance of the systems before contractual commitment. Without in-depth system knowledge, the project team will also face difficulty in specifying the modification and upgrades required to customise the platform for the new intended usage. Dealing with Uncertainty in Material Condition. Normally, the material condition of pre-owned platforms cannot be fully ascertained prior to acquisition as it is not possible to strip the entire platform down to it's component level. As it is impractical and too costly to order a complete overhaul and renewal of ever component, it's not unusual to adopt the existing refurbishment scope of work of the host country since the project team may not be equipped with sufficient knowledge to specify the required scope of refurbishment accurately. However, adopting the existing maintenance scope of work is inadequate. It is not unusual for the existing owner to drop selective scope of work of overhaul to manage cost and availability. This is usually an acceptable practice for the existing owner since the platform's original equipment manufacture (OEM) is able to provide timely support when defects occur due to their close proximity with their armed forces. The same would probably not be valid for the new owners of the pre-owned platforms as the OEM is most likely located at extended distances and thus unable to provide the required repair at short notice. In this case, there is a need to perform the additional overhaul scope of work not normally performed during the refurbishment, especially for safety critical systems, to mitigate potential future availability issues due to component failure. The additional scope of work would be next to impossible to establish at such short notice under such a normal contract situation. Poor material conditions are picked up typically through close supervision of the refurbishment process. The presence of an on-site supervision team, otherwise known as the Resident Programme Office, enables the prompt identification of defects over the course of the refurbishment phase and helps to mitigate potential schedule delays. In addition, the availability of a fast-track process will greatly facilitate the project team's engagement with the OEM to resolve issues expeditiously. The boundaries of such a fast track process would have to be defined during the acquisition management phase of the system's life cycle. Handling Existing Systems Beside from being unable to ascertain the exact material conditions of existing components, the project team would also likely be hard-pressed to provide the detailed modification and upgrades required to convert the pre-owned platforms to suit local needs due to insufficient system knowledge. Likely shortfalls will occur in areas such as adaptation to local conditions (different environment conditions), safety (due to differing workflows and safety tolerances), monitoring system (different operating philosophies), host country laws and regulations. Additional modifications not included within the original scope of work will likely incur substantial cost and adversely impact the schedule especially if identified late in the project management when design has been finalised. To mitigate such issues, a checklist of potential modifications would be helpful. Such a list would be accumulated over time drawing from the lessons learnt from similar projects. The applicability and critical level of each lesson would have to be assessed during the front-end planning phase. Another likely issue on existing systems relates to the performance of the pre-owned platform and the onboard system. While the refurbishment and upgrade would have rejuvenated and extended the service life of the pre-owned platform, it is not realistic to expect the pre-owned platform and the onboard system to perform to the originally specified performance. This is especially so for electromechanical systems. In the event where the the existing or modified system fails to meet specific performance requirements, disputes would arise between the OEM and the project team on the acceptability of the performance demonstrated and whether additional modification would be required to improve the performance. The resulting cost and impact on schedule would be another point of contention. To handle such issues, it is important to provide acceptable tolerance to handle the likely deterioration of performance due to ageing as well as a mechanism in the contract to handle the liability and responsibility in the event of such an occurrence. The mechanism should include cost-sharing formulae to handle situations where additional modifications of existing systems are required. Such a mechanism would have to be purposes during the acquisition management phase to gain the OEM's acceptance on the cost-sharing approach prior to contract signing. Configuration Management Challenges Over the course of the project, it is not uncommon to note discrepancies between the documented information and the physical configuration found on board the platforms. The most common observations are missing components, from items as minor as cable tages to major items like sub-assembles as well as the mismatch between the actual component and it's description as stated in the technical manuals (e.g. normal nuts were used instead of self-locking nuts). It is common to discover additional components fitted but not reflected in the drawings ( typical items are electrical sockets and storage boxes) as well as electrical connections in the drawings differing from physical connectors on board. It is also possible to note discrepancies in configurations between different platforms of the same class (such as additional structural fittings, elbows and extensions on various piping) Ad hoc corrective actions will be required to manage such discrepancies of to document the non-conformity. Other than inaccurate configuration, it is also likely that the text on the labels, tags, gauges, instructions and warning signs are written in the language of the host country. Such a configuration could post a dilemma. Enforcing blanket changes to English text would likely incur a substantial cost, bearing in mind that the related documentation such as drawings and technical manuals will need to be updated as well. In many cases, trade-offs will be necessary to achieve the right balance between operational efficiency/safety and cost effectiveness. Based on experience, all text with safety implications (such as warning signs, operational instructions and push buttons) should be replaced to reduce the likelihood of human error during operations. This would have to be imposed on the OEM during the acquisition management phase. Unfortunately, it is impractical and impossible to identify all the text that needs to be changed at contract signing. Hence, the remaining configuration issues would have to be resolved during the project implementation. Sine many configuration issues cannot be fully anticipated, it is necessary to set aside adequate budget to update the configuration to reflect actual conditions, and without compromising safety. Dealing with obsolescence. Equipment obsolescence is a key requirement that must be addressed to ensure supportability and maintainability post-delivery. This is especially critical when the pre-owned platforms are expected to be supported for an additional service life of greater than 10 years. It is important to demand that the OEM provide evidence during the acquisition management phase to identify potential obsolescence issues upfront. It is also important to continue to keep a close watch during the refurbishment or upgrade to identify further occurrences of potential obsolescence and resolve them promptly. Solutions to overcome obsolescence include acquiring the remaining spares, contracting the OEM for an extended maintenance agreement or warranty, sourcing third-party maintenance and supply support, and redesigning, replacing or upgrading the existing components or system.
To mitigate potential schedule delay, it is necessary to purchase the remaining available spares to ensure at least short-term supportability while efforts are taken to review the feasibility of the other solutions to obsolescence. Redesign and upgrade of obsolete components/systems are usually undertaken after a proper cost-effectiveness study is conducted since it will incur substantial cost and impact on schedule. Nevertheless, redesigning, replacing or upgrading existing components may be necessary during the course of the project implementation and it would therefore be important to address, if possible, how to manage such issues in the contract.
This is where we gather the details of the whole article.
With the advent of information comes plethora of knowledge about aircraft. And speaking of the things pertaining to the Philippine Air Force, one will wonder why fighter jets cannot be used against counterinsurgency operations and so on and so forth? Well, this discussion is coming from an informative discussion of a contributor in DefensePH as well as the writer for CIMSEC organization we will name as "Juramentado". And here are his viewpoints: WHAT'S WITH CLOSE-AIR SUPPORT AIRCRAFT?
An OV-10 Bronco of the Phil. Air Force.
Let's try something different. No pictures, no diagrams, not even a video with a banging soundtrack. This will help the Free Data folks as well. Let's avoid calling each other names or making ridiculous statements. You have no excuse not to read this post before replying because it's all text and the presentation is high level. The PAF calls it the Close Air Support (CAS) project. The reality is that it will be used to replace planes (OV-10 Broncos) that have been engaged for decades in COIN (COunter INsurgency) operations. The two are distantly related, but one is a specific mission flown by military planes, and the other describes a specific mode of warfare. Let's be very clear. COIN is expensive. Why? Because you're constantly putting up planes and crews on multiple missions against a very mobile, well-trained enemy who can hide in both jungle and mix in with urban/town populations. Think about the recent actions in Maute. Where did the rebels eventually hole up? The number of missions costs several things: besides crew fatigue and expenditure of bombs and bullets, there is this concept of how much it costs to fly the plane, expressed in cost per flight hour. That includes wear and tear on the plane, parts used or replaced, and engine time plus gas consumed. Just like a car's age is expressed in mileage driven, planes age based on how many hours they have spent in the air which puts stress and strain on all it's parts. Eventually you will reach end of life where it is too dangerous to keep flying the plane - this is what happened to the F-5s. This is also what will happen VERY SOON to the remaining OV-10 Broncos. Additionally, the engine is only rated to be operated for so many hours before it must be overhauled or replaced. In general, COIN missions will be a volume business. You will perform a LOT of them before you can find and hurt the enemy. So you're spending a lot of money. Now try that with a jet. A jet costs a LOT MORE per flight hour. Parts and engine are also appropriately more expensive to repair and replace. In short, the money you save by using a COIN aircraft like the Super Tucano let's you fly more missions, and have more opportunities to find and destroy the enemy. There are other factors as well - the rebels tend to hide, which means you will spend a long time Loitering over an area, looking for signs of their presence, waiting to reveal themselves. You will also be at Low Altitude a lot, so you can see better. Propeller COIN planes sip gas in these cases, compared to jets that guzzle them. A typical COIN plane can loiter for several hours, whereas jets times are in minutes. It' not very efficient to use jets for COIN. COIN planes can carry the same weapons as jets. This includes precision guided bombs, missiles and rockets. So the lethality is comparable. A good reason not to use COIN planes is when there is a possibility that the enemy has access to shoulder-fired missiles (MANPADs) or large caliber anti-aircraft guns. But the appearance of either means your Insurgency is now more of a war, and that's a much bigger problem than can be solved by just airplanes. IN SUMMARY Counter-insurgency aircrafts are different from the MRFs when it comes to roles. The former comes with weapons systems primarily to suppress the key areas held by the enemy, that is aside from supporting the troops in the ground. The same can be done by the latter, but it will have their fuels consume more which is costly for an operation. Hence, the jets are more for intercept other aircraft which purpose is to dominate the skies. Overall, the COIN aircraft is more economical in the sense that its frequent flybys and bombardment as well as surveillance brought by an efficient fuel consumption brings an idea that such aircraft, albeit being propeller-powered, is suitable for operations such as this one. Feel free to discuss. Rationally encouraged.
Capability of the FA-50 Light Combat Aircraft, the FA-50 PH is a modified version of the FA-50
Fact check about the FA-50PH.
"Albeit the reports that it serve as a light MRF, it holds truthfulness to that, if and only if Israeli weapons are to be fitted in the jets in a form of an upgrade which make it by par with Gripen C/D block. Moreover, the PAF's designation to this jet is Lead-in Fighter Trainer (LIFT). Considerably, the reason for this designation is for PAF to convince lawmakers to fund more for the MRF project.
FA-50PH + Israel Upgrade = Light MRF.
If it becomes a de facto MRF, no doubt, the "tama na yan" attitude sets in and the MRF program will be in total jeopardy once it happens. So, for the people who believe that FA-50PH is a light MRF, yes. You may be correct, but beware. Categorizing it as such will have a bad consequence to the MRF program." - Tirpitz
The FA-50 PH is like our AS-211, but even better, modern, faster, and advance. The real purpose of the Lead In Fighter Trainer (LIFT) acquisition program was to acquire "fighter trainers" for our Multi-Role Fighter (MRF) acquisition program on phase II/horizon II of the AFP modernization program but because of the reason that we do not have jet fighters during the Aquino administration, the Department of National Defense (DND), after the selection and declaration of the TA-50 as the winning aircraft on year 2012, negotiated with KIA for an upgrade.
FA-50 PH, 001 and 002, Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines
The Purpose of the FA-50
The FA-50 PH is like a twin bladed sword, it has a dual purpose and function; its first purpose and function as a Lead In Fighter Trainer aircraft is to train Philippine Air Force (PAF) pilots on operating 4th generation to 4.5th generation jet fighters, as a interim fighter it serves as a preparation for our Multi-Role Fighter acquisition program.
Its second purpose; and as a Light Combat Aircraft/Light-MRF, it should be expected that it will perform without any bit of doubt Light Combat Aircraft/Light-MRF roles such as:
Interception;
Reconnaissance;
Close-Air-Support (CAS);
Escort Missions;
Fighter vs Fighter engagements (Dog Fighting);
Etc.
Because it is not a Lead In Fighter Trainer nor it is design as such, it is primarily a Light Combat Aircraft/Light-MRF intended to replace the F-5 squadrons of the South Korean air force, its avionics, and weapons system are that of a jet fighter.
FA-50 PH in action
News report about the FA-50 PH
Let us compare the two
AS-211
"The S-211 is a small tandem two-seat shoulder-wing monoplane with a retractable tricycle landing gear and powered by a single Pratt & Whitney Canada JT15D-4C turbofan. Also, the aircraft was designed for a secondary close air support capability with four underwing hardpoints for the carriage of weapons and other external stores"
Upgrades:
Project Falcon: Optical sights from the retired F-5s were installed; Project Falcon Uniform: 2-Tone light and dark ghost gray paint scheme along with low visibility markings was painted on the aircraft to reduce their overall visibility; Project Falcon Hear: AN/ARC-34 UHF radios from the F-5A/B, Belly Gun Pod designed, developed and manufactured by Philippine company Aerotech Industries Philippines, Inc. (AIPI) with a M3 .50 cal Machine Gun, an automatic charger, and approximately 240 rounds of .50 cal ammunition were installed. Max speed is Mac 0.8. Source
AS-211 of the PAF, in action, AS-211 vs F-18 in a dog fight (just a friendly exercise)
FA-50 PH
"The KAI T-50 Golden Eagle is a family of South Korean supersonic advanced trainers and light combat aircraft, developed by Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) with Lockheed Martin. The T-50 is South Korea's first indigenous supersonic aircraft and one of the world's few supersonic trainers."
"The FA-50 is the most advanced version of the T-50, possessing more internal fuel capacity, enhanced avionics, a longer radome and a tactical data link"
Possibilities: "Plans call for 3 to 4 of 12 aircraft to be fitted with capability for beyond visual range (BVR) intercept. In March 2015, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported that the Philippines plans to order additional FA-50s, which is supported by the PAF flight plan 2028 that lists another 12 FA-50s planned for the future.
Maximum Speed Mac 1.5, it has a A-50 3 barrel rotary cannon, 7 Hard points. Source
Conclusion, the FA-50 PH is not only for ceremonies or for displays, if the government have armed it with the much needed weapons already then we could have used it already to its full potential, the time will come that we will witness and experience, with national pride, the full capabilities of the FA-50 a Light Combat Aircraft (LCA)/ Light Multi-Role Fighter (L-MRF) that just functions as a Lead In Fighter Trainer (LIFT) of the Philippine Air Force (PAF).
